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Key Points 
Motivated by the dual aims of strengthening the Middle East Peace Process and contributing to 
Palestinian state-building, the European Union and its member states have been the biggest 
donors of financial assistance to the Palestinians. But these efforts have not managed to achieve 
the desired change, as the EU failed to develop a coherent strategy to address Israel’s violations of 
international humanitarian law and it has accepted practices that undermine its political 
objectives. Hence, the aid has not contributed to a strong Palestinian government that can 
contribute to the security of both Palestinian and Israeli civilians. And meanwhile the 
Palestinian economy has become increasingly dependent on donor aid while Israel continues to 
strengthen its control over the territory. 
Recommendations 
1. The EU should conduct its bilateral relations with Israel in a manner that is coherent 
with its aid policies. The European External Action Service and the individual 
member states should insist that any strengthening of their relations with Israel is 
conditional upon its respect for international humanitarian law, a branch of 
international law that seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict on civilians. 
2. The EU and its member states should use their leverage with the PA (Palestinian 
Authority) in order to promote good governance and find practical ways to ensure 
aid effectiveness both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  
3. The EU and its member states should take more measures to ensure that aid is 
received by people in need and that illegal practices on the part of Israel do not 
hamper its effectiveness.  
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Introduction 
For many years, the European Union and its 
member states have been the biggest donors of 
financial assistance to the Palestinians. Since the 
start of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) in 
1993, the EU has targeted its aid primarily at 
strengthening the peace process in the context of 
a continuing occupation and a transitional 
agreement between Israel and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO). Through its aid 
efforts, the EU wanted to contribute to 
Palestinian state-building and to reaching 
agreement on the two-state solution.  
Yet, the EU did not want to restrict its role to 
being a mere payer of aid; it aspired to become a 
player in the diplomatic scene. By deepening 
and strengthening its bilateral relations with 
Israel and through the process of socialisation, it 
hoped that Israel would become more familiar 
with the practices of the EU and the acquis 
communautaire in particular, thereby having 
positive effect on Israel’s willingness to abide by 
its international obligations.  
Offering Israel carrots without brandishing any 
sticks, however, did not give the EU more 
leverage. On the contrary. Israel has largely 
ignored the EU’s appeals to respect its 
obligations as an occupying power. Furthermore 
it has not given up its ambition to extend its 
effective control over the occupied Palestinian 
territory (oPt) and it applied the agreements 
with the EU to its settlements, despite the fact 
that the EU has insisted that it cannot recognise 
Israel’s sovereignty beyond the pre-1967 borders 
and has taken steps accordingly. In 2012, the 
Foreign Affairs Council committed itself to 
ensure that all future agreements 
“unequivocally and explicitly indicate their 
inapplicability to the territories occupied by 
Israel in 1967” (FAC, 2012). The Council 
established a clear basis for member state action 
to prevent the designation of settlement goods 
as “Israeli”, which resulted in an interpretative 
notice on the indication of origin of settlement 
goods (EEAS, 2015). Yet, this has not dissuaded 
Israel from deepening its control over the oPt 
and continuing its settlement expansion.  
 
The current Israeli government, dominated by 
right-wing parties that question the two-state 
solution, is outspoken in its refusal to give up its 
control over the West Bank. It opposes 
international assistance in Area C, representing 
60% of the West Bank, and has signalled to the 
EU that it will demolish projects that benefit the 
Palestinian population. Recently, this has led to 
an escalation of demolitions of EU-funded 
projects by Israeli security forces. Furthermore, 
Israel is reinforcing its separation policy 
between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and 
is hampering reconstruction efforts via ongoing 
restrictions on the import of construction goods 
in Gaza. European policy-makers are 
increasingly critical about Israel’s actions 
undermining the EU’s aid efforts. The debate 
about aid effectiveness is being waged at the 
highest political level. Yet, as long as the Israeli 
government is unwilling to comply with its 
international obligations, the EU’s role will be 
mainly limited to mitigating humanitarian 
crises.  
Internationally there is a consensus that the 
status quo is untenable and that a political 
horizon needs to be created. After the failed 
peace talks in 2014, the US administration did 
start another round of peace negotiations but it 
will refrain from actively pursuing the talks 
before the Presidential elections in November. In 
order to revive the political process, France 
wants to hold an international conference in the 
course of 2016 that would ideally result in a 
statement on agreed principles for renewing the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. The Quartet 
(composed of the UN, the US, Russia and the 
EU) is also preparing a report on the situation 
on the ground and the obstacles to renewing the 
peace talks. It might include recommendations 
to advance the two-state solution (Quartet, 
2016). This is an important development for the 
EU, as it wants to create a momentum to enable 
an international consensus on the parameters of 
a resolution. 
Donors have underestimated a 
complicated policy environment  
From the early peace process onwards, the EU 
decided not to pursue a rights-based approach, 
but rather to take a pragmatic stance, in order to 
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secure Israel's cooperation. The aid strategy of 
the EU member states and the European 
Commission followed the logic of their political 
strategy. Donors did not understand that in 
order to move towards a two-state solution, it 
was necessary to transform both sides. They did 
not pressure Israel to withdraw to the armistice 
line of 1949. Moreover, there was no reference in 
the Oslo agreements to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and Israel's obligations as an 
occupying power, as Israel had vetoed all 
references to international humanitarian law 
(IHL). Recently, as the Israeli right-wing parties 
became stronger, some Israeli officials have 
claimed that Israel has sovereignty in “Judea 
and Samaria”. The EU’s reluctance to strongly 
challenge Israel’s position has contributed to a 
climate in which the rule of law is absent. 
Consequently, Palestinian state-building has 
turned out to be more problematic than donors 
had anticipated. Throughout the peace process, 
Israel has continued its violations of IHL, even if 
it is bound by the 1907 Hague Regulations and 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. As long as it is an 
occupying power, Israel is responsible for the 
welfare of the Palestinian civilians and it has to 
ensure that their needs are met, including food, 
medical supplies and services. Israel did not 
want to give the PA (Palestinian Authority) full 
sovereignty, nor did it want to fulfil the needs of 
the occupied population. Since Israel has not 
taken up its responsibilities, donor assistance 
has been used to meet the continuing and 
growing needs of the Palestinian population. 
Thus, the aid deliveries have made donors 
unwillingly assume responsibility for the 
Palestinian population (CIDSE, 2008). 
Moreover, Israel has actively opposed the 
development of a healthy Palestinian economy 
by introducing new measures of control, such as 
closure. It has also kept control over numerous 
functions of the government, such as land use, 
borders and the right to residency. Israel's 
ongoing occupation and its refusal to transfer 
additional powers to the PA proved to be 
detrimental to state-building. The occupation 
has thwarted the EU's hoped for a ‘transitional’ 
scenario, in which the newly established PA 
would successfully establish its authority and 
become an effective administrator and provider 
of public services while gaining popular 
legitimacy. 
In the years following the signing of the Oslo 
Agreements, the donor community did not 
sufficiently address the grave consequences of 
declining development and the failure of 
Palestinian state-building, arising from Israel's 
continued abuse of its effective control. Nor did 
donors develop a coherent strategy to address 
Israel’s violations of IHL and to deal with a 
transitional authority without any substantial 
authority. Donors chose to ignore the complex 
policy environment and refused to denounce the 
occupation as the main obstacle to development 
in order to avoid a political dispute with Israel. 
Furthermore, donors have insufficiently tackled 
the PA’s failings in the field of human rights, 
especially after the isolation of the Hamas-led 
government in 2006 and the military coup by 
Hamas in the Gaza Strip in 2007. The democratic 
deficit in Palestine, where parliamentary and 
presidential elections are long overdue, has not 
been fundamentally addressed. This situation 
falls far short of meeting the EU’s norms on 
good governance. As a provider of public 
services to the Palestinian population, the PA 
has to provide accountability for resource 
allocation and management (European 
Commission, 2014). Even if the PA has made 
efforts to strengthen its legal and institutional 
framework against corruption, there is a need 
for better coordination of anti-corruption efforts 
and institutions. According to the World Bank, 
reforms are still incomplete in key areas such as 
public procurement, civil service hiring and 
regulation of the private sector (World Bank, 
2011). The lack of access to information law also 
prevents civil society organisations and the 
media from performing their role as watchdogs 
(Transparency International, 2011). 
The EU shifts from development to 
humanitarian aid 
Since the start of the second Intifada in 2000 
onwards, the EU has moved increasingly from 
conflict prevention and peace-building to 
conflict management (Lemore, 2005). The events 
of the Intifada, including Israel's excessive use of 
force, compelled donors to focus on emergency 
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aid. The Commission and the EU member states 
significantly increased their humanitarian 
assistance to the oPt in order to avoid a 
breakdown of basic social services and a 
humanitarian disaster. It shifted much of its 
assistance from more long-term institution-
building to badly needed humanitarian 
assistance, which was given in order to prevent 
a humanitarian disaster, since the already weak 
Palestinian economy had virtually collapsed. 
The tightening of the closure regime in Gaza 
and the construction of the Separation Barrier 
aggravated this situation. The donors saw it as 
their role to protect Palestinian civilians from 
the undesired outcome of the ongoing crisis. In 
addition, the aid was meant to restore the 
conditions necessary to revive the peace process.  
During the legislative election in January 2006, 
Hamas won enough votes to form a majority 
government. Its refusal to abide by the Quartet’s 
principles and accept Israel's right to exist, 
abandon violence and accept the previous 
agreements between Israel and the PLO, made 
the Commission and the member states freeze 
their direct budget aid to the PA in April 2006. 
The development of alternative channels for EU 
assistance such as the Temporary International 
Mechanism (2006), and PEGASE (2008), did not 
prevent further reversal of development, but it 
did manage to ensure that salaries were paid to 
civil servants and that public hospitals and 
schools kept running. Furthermore, many of the 
pre-existing checks and balances and measures 
to avoid corruption were abandoned overnight 
to transfer funds directly to the Presidency. 
In addition, the feud between Hamas and Fatah 
had serious political and humanitarian 
consequences. Despite ongoing talks and the 
formation of a government of national 
consensus in 2014, reconciliation has stalled. In 
spite of its alleged willingness to relinquish its 
security presence near the border crossings, 
Hamas did not yield control over the crossings 
to the PA. Fatah refuses to integrate around 
40,000 civil servants whom Hamas has recruited 
since 2007 into the payroll of the PA (IMF, 2015). 
The ongoing rift has affected the quality of basic 
services, duplicated the channels of aid delivery 
and hampered the reconstruction in Gaza. As a 
result, according to humanitarian actors, the 
basic needs of Gaza’s population, such as 
education, health, social welfare, water and 
municipal services, are not being met. 
Palestine remains one of the world's leading per 
capita recipients of foreign support. Between 
2007 and 2013, Palestinians were given €300 
million per year under the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI). In 2014, another €309.5 million was 
distributed via the PEGASE direct financial 
support programme (€170.5 million), United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) (€87 
million) and development programmes (EEAS). 
In spite of the donors’ efforts and the PA’s 
financial improvements, Palestinian poverty and 
aid dependency have reached unprecedented 
levels (World Bank, 2015a). The situation has 
been aggravated by the donors’ response to 
Hamas’ coup in the Gaza Strip in 2007, Israel’s 
separation policy and the three subsequent wars 
in the Gaza Strip. This has obliged the donors to 
shift even further to humanitarian aid, to the 
detriment of state-building. Between 2000 and 
2014, the EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection department (ECHO) provided €700 
million in humanitarian funding to oPt (ECHO, 
2014).   
Despite a growing trend to link development 
aid from support for local businesses and 
international trade, aid for Palestine and, in 
particular, for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, 
remains far behind best practices.1 Donor money 
is used to mitigate the worst effects of the 
humanitarian crisis, but this happens in ways 
that discourage long-term development and 
rarely look beyond emergencies. The ownership 
and responsibility of all parties to the conflict 
towards the most vulnerable population is also 
not encouraged. Without a political solution, the 
Palestinian economy will continue to be 
unsustainable and dependent on donor aid, 
while the decreasing political prospect for a 
viable two-state solution and Palestinian 
                                                   
1 For example, the Dutch Presidency of the EU, in the 
first half of 2016, is focusing its efforts within the 
Foreign Affairs Council on the ‘aid and trade’ agenda at 
EU level. See programme of the Netherlands Presidency 
of the Council of the European Union 1 January-30 June 
2016. 
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reconciliation increases donors’ fatigue 
(European Commission, 2015b). 
Area C: Palestinian development made 
impossible 
Approximately 300,000 Palestinians live in Area 
C in about 530 residential areas, 241 of which are 
located entirely in Area C (OCHA, 2014). 
According to the Israeli Central Bureau of 
Statistics, another 356,000 Israeli civilians reside 
in 135 settlements and some 100 ‘outposts’ 
established in Area C, over which Israel claims 
to have full sovereignty. Israeli policies make 
Palestinian development in Area C virtually 
impossible, as only 1% of Area C is destined for 
Palestinian planning by Israeli authorities. 
Between 2010 and 2014, the Israeli Civil 
Administration (ICA) approved only 1.5% of all 
Palestinian building permit applications. As a 
result, Palestinians are left with no other option 
but to build without a permit, risking the 
demolition of their houses. Since 2011, over 
3,500 Palestinians have been displaced by 
demolitions in Area C and over 11,000 
demolition orders, affecting an estimated 13,000 
structures are still outstanding (OCHA, 2015c). 
Besides the continuing settlement expansion and 
demolitions, a growing concern is the transfer 
plans of Palestinian communities. The ICA 
advanced a plan in 2012 that calls for the 
removal of at least 19 Palestinian Bedouin and 
herder communities from their current locations 
in the E1 area in the periphery of Jerusalem. 
These locations are earmarked for settlements. 
These communities would be moved to three 
urban relocation sites (OCHA, 2014). In order to 
put pressure on the population, Israel hampers 
the provision of services and obstructs aid 
delivery (Knesset, 2014). However, the Fourth 
Geneva Convention prohibits the forced transfer 
of the local population and the destruction of 
the occupied population’s property, and obliges 
the occupying power to agree to and facilitate 
the delivery of aid.  
These developments have seriously affected the 
EU’s aid efforts. Moreover, in late 2011 and early 
2012, reports emerged about demolitions of or 
demolition threats to EU and member states’ 
projects in Area C. In April 2014 and again in 
August 2015, the Israeli Knesset's Subcommittee 
on Judea and Samaria, which reports to the 
Foreign and Security Affairs Committee, 
discussed the “illegal Palestinian construction in 
Area C”. It called on the ICA to allocate more 
resources to the demolition of Palestinian 
structures in order to cause the displacement of 
Palestinians from areas in Area C that are of 
priority for the settlement movement. The 
Subcommittee members and the Coordinator of 
Governmental Activities in the Territories also 
discussed the need to target EU and other 
donor-funded structures. Accordingly in 2014, 
over 600 Palestinian structures were demolished 
in Area C and more than 1,200 Palestinians have 
been displaced (OCHA, 2015b). In 2015, over 450 
structures in Area C were demolished. In the 
first quarter of 2016 alone, Israeli security forces 
have demolished over 500 structures, of which 
140 were internationally financed. Between 
January and April 2016, assistance by ECHO 
and the member states valuing almost €210,000 
was demolished (Koenders & Ploumen, 2016). 
The problem of Israel’s demolitions of EU-
funded projects is not new. However, Israel is 
increasingly targeting donor-funded projects. 
According to UN OCHA and EU sources, 
donor-funded projects constitute roughly 20% of 
all structures demolished or seized by Israel in 
recent years.2 Already in 2011, the High 
Representative had indicated that for damaged 
EU projects, Israeli officials were approached 
and compensation had been asked in some 
cases. In its Council Conclusions of May 2012, 
the EU stated that it “will continue to provide 
financial assistance for Palestinian development 
in Area C and expects such investments to be 
protected for future use”.  
                                                   
2 Some79 donor funded structures were demolished in 
2012, 90 in 2013 and 118 in 2014 (see UN OCHA oPt, 
Annual Humanitarian Overview 2014, p. 19). Bringing 
into account dismantled and seized structures, 157 
structures were removed in 2013 and 143 in 2014 (see 
UN OCHA oPt, West Bank Demolitions and 
Displacement: An overview, December 2014). In 2015, 
110 donor-funded structures were demolished, 
constituting some 20%of the total of 539 structures 
demolished (see UN OCHA oPt, Humanitarian Bulletin, 
December 2015).  
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Between 2010 and January 2014, EU 
humanitarian assistance projects with a value of 
€84,000 were demolished. No compensation was 
received. In December 2014, the EU decided to 
react systematically to demolitions and 
confiscations. The Commission outlined a 
common EU approach to this issue in February 
2015. Firstly, it would set up a comprehensive 
and timely monitoring mechanism of EU and 
member state projects by mid-2015. Member 
states agreed to “react” systematically to threats 
through diplomacy and legal assistance to 
beneficiaries. In case the engagement with Israel 
would not lead to a freeze of the demolitions 
and confiscations, the EU and member states 
would be able to ask for compensation 
(European Commission, 2015a). 
It was not until September 2015 that the EU 
embarked on a formal structured dialogue with 
Israel with an aim to halt the demolitions. 
During this six-month period, Israel has 
continued and even stepped up its demolitions 
of EU-funded projects. Despite continuous 
waves of demolitions, neither the EU nor its 
member states (other than Belgium) have 
publicly asked for compensation (MO*, 2015). 
According to the UN, projects financed by both 
EU and non-EU donors, with a value of more 
than €4 million, currently risk demolition. 
However, no reactive nor preventive EU 
mechanism has been created to systematically 
respond to further demolitions.  
Gaza: Arrested development 
Following the takeover of Hamas in Gaza in 
2007, Israel tightened its land, sea and air 
blockade on the Gaza Strip. Gaza and West Bank 
became effectively separated by Israel and the 
international community, resulting in a political, 
social and economic fragmentation of the 
occupied Palestinian territory. The blockade has 
had a devastating impact on Gaza’s economy. It 
reduced Gaza’s GDP by about 51% (World 
Bank, 2015b). The unemployment rate in the 
Gaza Strip is now the highest in the world: 43% 
of the population, and over 60% of the youth, is 
unemployed. Despite the fact that nearly 80% of 
Gaza’s residents receive aid, around 40% still 
lives below the poverty line (World Bank, 
2015b). 
In addition to more than eight years of economic 
blockade, Gaza has witnessed three military 
operations during the past six years. At least 
2,100 Palestinians were killed and more than 
500,000 were displaced as a result of Israel’s 
military operation in the summer of 2014. More 
than 20,000 Palestinian homes, 148 schools, 15 
hospitals and 45 healthcare centres were 
damaged or destroyed (UNCTAD, 2015). In 
September 2014, Israel, the PA and the UN 
agreed to establish the Gaza Reconstruction 
Mechanism (GRM) to enable construction and 
reconstruction work. However, Israel still 
imposes enormous restrictions and only a 
limited amount of all needed construction 
materials has been allowed into the Gaza Strip. 
Although EU member states have pledged $568 
million for Gaza’s reconstruction (Carnegie 
Europe, 2014a), just 3,000 of the severely 
damaged or destroyed houses have been rebuilt 
so far and 75,000 persons remain displaced. 
(OCHA, 2016). It seems clear that the GRM has 
shown to be insufficient given Israel’s ongoing 
restrictive policy. Within this mechanism, Israel 
is appointed to approve individual applications 
of construction materials and is allowed to veto 
any decision regarding companies delivering 
construction materials. Although Israel was 
given this authority ostensibly to guarantee its 
security, this control renders the whole 
reconstruction process slower and more costly.  
The blockade also impacts the internal division 
of Palestinian factions on a political level. The 
inability of the Palestinian government 
representatives to move freely between the West 
Bank and Gaza makes it impossible to govern 
effectively. Moreover, although local elections 
were held in 2012 in the West Bank, no national 
elections have been held since 2006. 
Consequently, the international community 
holds on to its isolation policy of Hamas and 
does not have contact with the local authorities 
in Gaza. Despite the establishment of a 
Palestinian Government of National Consensus 
in 2014, internal disputes between Fatah and 
Hamas are ongoing. According to humanitarian 
actors, there is still a reluctance to allocate 
sufficient resources to basic services in Gaza, 
leading to delays in the transfer of money from 
Ramallah to Gaza.  
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Some donors have launched initiatives to assist 
the process of reintegration of the two 
authorities. The EU recognises these efforts as an 
“area of new priority in its technical assistance”. 
The reintegration initiatives, mainly in the 
health and education sectors, are only making 
slow progress at a technical level (Carnegie 
Europe, 2014b). Extending the programmes to 
the political level will be far more complicated 
as long as the EU holds on to its no-contact 
policy with Hamas’ authorities in Gaza. This 
policy effectively hinders institution-building, 
which is necessary for a long-term development 
strategy implemented by a viable state, and 
often prevents recovery and development 
assistance from reaching vulnerable 
populations. 
Conclusion and recommendations 
Aid is often disbursed in a political environment 
that donors cannot control. However, if applied 
under conditions that are impossible to achieve, 
aid can be harmful or contribute to the status 
quo. This has been the case in the oPt where the 
humanitarian situation is defined as a protracted 
protection crisis driven by insufficient respect 
for international law (OCHA, 2015a). In order 
not to harm its relations with Israel, the EU has 
not sufficiently highlighted international law in 
its operational policy. Yet, the EU has failed to 
gain leverage in Israel and did not win the trust 
of the Israeli authorities. Hence, it was unable to 
establish itself as a strong player and its role was 
mainly restricted to being a payer.  
Donors need to fundamentally rethink their 
strategies. Firstly, aid effectiveness must be 
improved. For this to take place, dialogue on 
access to humanitarian aid must be held with all 
parties to the conflict and clear standards for 
improvement must be set. The EU also needs to 
pay further attention to transparency and checks 
and balances in order to improve the PA’s 
performance and serve the needs of its 
population. Secondly, donors have to ensure 
respect for international law and promote the 
rule of law while giving assistance. They have to 
stress that donor money does not absolve parties 
to the conflict from their obligations under 
international law and ensure that the delivery of 
aid is not impeded by such violations. In this 
respect, the EU urgently needs to develop a 
coherent response to prevent and respond to 
Israel’s demolitions of EU-funded projects and 
structures in the West Bank.  
Lastly, the EU has to reverse the tendency where 
the Palestinian economy becomes increasingly 
dependent on donor aid while Israel continues 
to strengthen its control over the territory and 
natural resources that are necessary to enable 
Palestinian development. Without an easing of 
Israel's closure policy in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, poverty will only continue to grow. 
In the absence of a political settlement, aid has 
limited potential. If the EU’s assistance is not 
linked to a political agreement that ends the 
occupation, it cannot advance peace.  
Recommendations 
- The EU should conduct its bilateral relations 
with Israel in a manner that is coherent with 
its aid policies. The EEAS and the individual 
member states must insist that any 
strengthening of their relations with Israel is 
conditional upon its respect for IHL. 
o The human rights situation in Palestine 
must be given a more prominent part in 
the EU-Israel dialogue on the Middle 
East Peace Process. This dialogue should 
focus on ensuring Israel’s respect for 
international law.  
- The EU and its member states should use 
their leverage with the PA in order to 
promote good governance and find practical 
ways to ensure aid effectiveness both in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  
o The EU and its member states need to 
insist that the PA improves its 
performance in the field of transparency 
and human-rights. Since a significant 
amount of the PA budget is devoted to 
the security sector, it needs to meet basic 
standards regarding accountability and 
the rule of law. 
o The EU and its member states should 
support independent audits of PA 
expenditure, also to ensure the equitable 
distribution between the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip. 
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o Discussions with local authorities and 
actors, including Hamas in the Gaza 
Strip, are key to enable the effective 
delivery of assistance and the practical 
realisation of aid projects.  
- The EU and its member states should take 
more measures to ensure that aid is received 
by people in need and that illegal practices 
on the part of Israel do not hamper its 
effectiveness. Therefore, it is key that the EU 
explores instruments to assign the financial 
responsibility for damage to EU-financed 
projects or infrastructure affected by the 
unlawful use of force to Israel as the 
internationally responsible party. 
o Given that the structured dialogue with 
Israel, which was aimed at addressing 
the issue of Israel’s demolitions, has not 
brought about their freeze or even 
reduction, the member states have to 
implement their commitments and 
register the financial losses, publicise the 
costs of the destruction and confiscation 
of EU-funded structures and publicly 
demand compensation. 
o The Belgian Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
and Development have already called for 
compensation within a European 
framework. This should be a priority in 
order to allow the EEAS and the member 
states to develop a coherent response to 
prevent and respond to Israel’s 
demolition of EU-funded projects and 
structures in the West Bank, including 
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